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Since the end of the Cold War, Islam has resurfaced as one of the West’s pri-
mary Others. Edward Said has shown that Islam has long provided a mirror 
or foil for the West’s self-defi nition; what these two studies by Nabil Matar 
powerfully demonstrate is that the role it has played in this process of self-
defi nition has not remained constant. The Islam of Orientalism dates largely, 
argues Matar, from the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire’s long, 
slow decline was already underway. During the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, by contrast, Islam was the object of fear, admiration and fasci-
nation, “a powerful civilization which [Britons] could neither possess nor 
ignore” (Islam 20). Although England was at this time laying the groundwork 
for their colonial empire, “In the interactions between Britons and Muslims 
there was no colonial discourse, practice or goal. Muslims were seen to be dif-
ferent and strange, infi dels and ‘barbarians,’ admirable or fearsome, but they 
did not constitute colonial targets” (Turks 12). In this particular cultural en-
counter, the English were by no means confi dent of their superiority.
In these two works, Matar convincingly makes the argument that the place 
of Islam in the English world picture has not been adequately accounted for 
in scholarship on the period. This, in spite of the fact that Muslims “repre-
sented the most widely visible non-Christian people on English soil in this 
period—more so than the Jews and the American Indians, the chief Others 
in British Renaissance history” (Turks 3). When scholarship does take notice 
of Muslims, argues Matar, it often unhelpfully confl ates North Africans with 
sub-Saharans, which “is misleading because England’s relations with sub-
Saharan Africans were relations of power, domination and slavery, while re-
lations with the Muslims of North Africa and the Levant were of anxious 
equality and grudging emulation” (Turks 7–8). In spite of the ongoing skir-
mishes between English and Muslim pirates and privateers, Elizabeth’s gov-
ernment, shows Matar, had very cordial relations with both the Ottoman 
Empire and various North African states, particularly the kingdom of Algiers. 
Both sides, at various points, either expected or asked for military assistance 
from the other.
Matar’s work thus challenges recent, more monolithic accounts of differ-
ence within the early modern period, and it also offers ample demonstration 
that the most familiar view of Muslims, that offered by the Renaissance stage, 
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is not the only, or even the dominant, view of Muslims in England at the 
time. The two studies cover overlapping terrain. The earlier study, Islam in 
Britain, 1558–1685, is concerned largely with the representation of Islam or 
the Muslim world in English writing, whether religious, political or literary. 
Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery casts a wider net, look-
ing at actual encounters between England and the Muslim world, whether 
this took the form of Muslim ambassadors visiting London or English pirates 
being held in slave prisons in Algiers. Ultimately, the argument of the latter 
book is that the representation of Islam changes signifi cantly in the early 
modern period, at least partly as a result of England’s encounter with the na-
tives of North America.
In Islam in Britain, Matar surveys a range of texts that offer representations 
of Muslim culture, tradition or religion, including sermons, plays, English 
translations of the Qur’an, alchemical treatises, religious polemic and escha-
tological writings. Not surprisingly, conversion, whether from Christianity 
to Islam or the reverse, surfaces frequently. In actual fact, shows Matar, the 
conversions were overwhelmingly in one direction: the Muslim world offered 
soldiers and sailors, many of whom converted after being captured, advan-
tages that they could never have in England, including wealth, status, and 
infl uence: “Although travelers, captives and chroniclers always made a point 
of denigrating the convert for renouncing his religion and country, they con-
fi rmed that renegades lived in prosperity and wealth: indeed, the over-all 
portrait of the renegade in their writings is of one who had met with suc-
cess” (50). On stage, however, they faired rather differently, where the fi gure 
of the renegade is used to show “the futility and despair of apostasy” (51), 
sometimes by changing quite dramatically the histories of actual renegades. 
Matar argues that playwrights did this in order to “inject fear about the con-
sequences of apostasy” (58), but this raises the question as to why the com-
mercial theatre, which was not an agent of the state, would worry about such 
a thing in the fi rst place. It is at least equally likely that the stage is playing 
on some deeper fear or anxiety about conversion, or some desire on the part 
of the culture at large to believe that the converts were in fact wrong. Given 
that the renegades were most often the common man, with little hope for 
advancement in England, it may well be that these anxieties are ultimately 
about class.
In scientifi c and philosophical writings, the picture was markedly differ-
ent. There was a great respect for Arabic learning at Oxford and Cambridge, 
which both established chairs of Arabic Studies in the 1630s, and “Arabic 
became an adjunct to a complete university education and, as P. M. Holt has 
stated, the hallmark of the enlightened Englishman—particularly the man 
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of science” (87). The Arabic infl uence is seen most clearly in scientifi c fi elds 
that would rapidly become intellectually disreputable, alchemy and astron-
omy, but other Arabic texts in translation were also widely read and referred 
to, including the twelfth-century Sufi  work by Ibn Turayl, Hayy ibn Yaqzan, 
and the Qur’an, which fi rst appeared in English in Alexander Ross’s 1649 
translation.
A third major source of references to Muslim culture included religious 
polemic (generally of the “even the Turks are better than the Catholics/
Protestants/Puritans” variety) and works concerned with conversion to 
Christianity. Actual missionary activity was low to non-existent (121, 132–
7), but the conversion of the Turk nonetheless remained a cherished dream. 
In the large body of writings both popular and academic that concerned 
the coming apocalypse, conversion became a millennial imperative; it is in 
these eschatological writings, argues Matar, that we see “the fi rst anti-Muslim 
and anti-Arab racism in English thought” (155). Here as elsewhere, Matar’s 
scholarship usefully complicates the accepted picture of the origins of ra-
cialized thinking in England. According to the most popular eschatological 
fantasy, the Jews would resettle Palestine after driving out the Muslims, and 
then would convert to Protestantism. This represents a signifi cant historical 
change: “In the medieval period, the Muslim was the ‘ally’ of the Jew as the 
object of Christian invective and polemic: by the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, English writers differentiated the two groups and pitted one 
against the other” (181). This more sympathetic (or at least utilitarian) ap-
proach to the Jews is partly the result of different status of Jews and Muslims 
within the period: Jews were a scattered and oppressed nation, whereas 
the power of the Ottoman empire made them largely inassimilable to the 
European imagination.
The historical shifts in England’s thinking about Islam, especially in re-
lation to its Others, is also the subject of Turks, Moors and Englishmen in 
the Age of Discovery. Once again, Matar offers documentation of an amaz-
ing range of encounters between England and Islam, whether in London, 
Istanbul, off the coast of Tangiers or Dover. Here Matar advances the thesis, 
which he hinted at in the fi rst book, that the changed thinking about the 
Muslim world is at least partly the result of England’s encounter with the na-
tives of North America: “for the fi rst time, Muslims of the Ottoman Empire 
and North Africa began to be categorized as ‘Barbarians’ by English (and 
other European) writers. The use of the term at this stage in the history of 
Christian-Muslim interaction is striking because in the medieval period, the 
term had not been used” (14–15). The label, of course, ultimately stems from 
North American encounters. 
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The parallel appellation is not the result of any symmetry between the 
encounters. The book argues instead that calling the Muslims “barbarian” 
was a psychological compensation, born out of an anxiety produced by en-
countering a powerful culture that viewed the English as inferior: “English 
writers and strategists recognized, from the fi rst establishment of the Turkey 
Company until the Great Migration and well into the rest of the seventeenth 
century, that their colonial ideology was winning against the Indians but 
losing against the Muslims; they were enslaving Indians while Muslims were 
enslaving them” (103). In spite of these striking differences, the English in-
creasingly viewed the two cultures through the same lens, until “By the end of 
the seventeenth century the Muslim ‘savage’ and the Indian ‘savage’ became 
completely superimposable in English thought and ideology” (170). 
The accusations of barbarism were bolstered in both cases by discoveries 
of sodomy, but here the argument goes a little astray. Matar shows how ubiq-
uitous the references to sodomy in Muslim lands were in travel literature, 
but doesn’t really address the accuracy of these observations or what might 
be revealed by this English fascination with perversion abroad. Behind the 
argument is the implicit suggestion that things are pretty much the same all 
over, and the English are simply being hypocritical. The admirable historical 
and cultural nuance that Matar elsewhere displays is here lost and the argu-
ment is further muddied by the assertion that “sodomy” is simply the period’s 
term for homosexuality (109). This is, interestingly enough, contradicted by 
Appendix C, which contains an excerpt from Ahmad bin Qasim’s dialogue 
between a Frenchman and a Muslim; in the dialogue, it is clear that “sodomy” 
refers to heterosexual anal intercourse (193–4). 
In both of these studies, Matar points in a highly illuminating way to the 
wide gulf that frequently existed between how Muslims fi gured in the English 
imagination to what the English actually knew about Muslims through their 
many encounters. Not least among the valuable lessons we are given is that 
race and cultural difference in the period are complex and often contradic-
tory matters. And not only are they contradictory, they are not stable across 
time. The highly schizophrenic relation of England to the Muslim world that 
is mapped out in these two books, alternately admiring and vilifying, would 
change as the power of England and its technology grew, and the Ottoman 
empire began to decline. It was only then that Europe felt to free to mytholo-
gize the Orient as it pleased. Opening up what was largely forgotten terri-
tory, these works both exemplify and call for a more sensitive approach to 
the differences and the parallels between the various nations and peoples that 
England encountered on its way to empire.
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